

A RAND NOTE

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Is There Hope for the Horn of Africa?
Reflections on the Political and Economic Impasses

Paul B. Henze

June 1988

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This Note is the extended and updated version of a paper that was presented at a conference on Crisis in the Horn of Africa: Causes and Prospects, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., June 1987. The study, which draws on the author's visit to Ethiopia in March 1987, reviews the destabilizing effects on the Horn of Africa of increasing Soviet activism; famine in Ethiopia and Sudan; rebellions in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Eritrea; and Somalian irredentism. The author believes that to alleviate the economic and political deterioration of the region, Western governments must join in setting up an international peace and mediation commission that would work toward (1) the acceptance by the countries involved of the de facto borders and arbitration of disputes; (2) the persuasion of foreign powers to cease support of separatism and dissidence; (3) a moratorium on arms shipments to the region; (4) the creation of an international group to monitor compliance with the peace process and human rights standards; (5) adherence by all donors to common criteria for the provision of emergency relief and development aid; and (6) increased regional economic development aid.

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**Prepared for
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
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PREFACE

This Note is the extended and updated version of a paper that was the concluding presentation at a conference, *Crisis in the Horn of Africa: Causes and Prospects*, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., June 17-20, 1987. The author brings more than 25 years of study of, and involvement in, Horn of Africa affairs to this assessment of the present condition and future prospects of the countries of the region. During the past year, the author has been occupied *inter alia* in economic research sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under the auspices of RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This research has been conducted within the framework of the International Economic Policy Program under a project entitled "Study of the Economy of Revolutionary Ethiopia: Comparative Economic Performance and the Burden of Military Expenditures." While not formally a product of this research, which is being reported in several other RAND studies, the present Note relates to portions of it. It also reflects firsthand observations of the author during a visit to Ethiopia in March 1987.



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SUMMARY

The 1950s were a hopeful time in the Horn of Africa. Although most of the 30 million people who then lived in the region still led traditional lives, all looked forward to accelerated economic and political development. As Sudan and Somalia became independent and Ethiopia embarked on a program for modernization, the region entered the 1960s with high expectations fed by increasing Western economic aid.

Soviet ambitions for greater influence in the region were already growing, however. The Soviets whetted Somali irredentism by providing generous military assistance and stoked rebellion in Eritrea with clandestine arms. After military coups succeeded in Khartoum and Mogadishu in 1969, the Soviet arms flow increased sharply. By this time, the Sudanese southerners were rebelling openly and Ethiopia was trying to cope with insurgency in the Ogaden. Thus, by the end of the 1960s, political tensions were threatening stability in the area, although economic growth continued to accelerate in Ethiopia and development prospects remained promising in Sudan and Somalia.

Increasing Soviet activism brought disaster to the Horn in the 1970s. Ethiopian-Sudanese reconciliation in 1971, which reduced the rebellions in Eritrea and the Sudanese South to manageable proportions, did not survive the Ethiopian revolution of 1974. Although the military junta that took power in Addis Ababa tilted toward Moscow from the start, the Soviets responded to the Ethiopian revolution with only a treaty of friendship and a vast new military aid program for Somalia.

Multiple internal revolts in Ethiopia and renewed rebellion in southern Sudan undermined these countries' economies. When Somalia attacked Ethiopia in 1977, the entire region degenerated into war. Soviet arms and Cuban mercenaries rescued the Ethiopian revolutionary junta in early 1978. Hordes of refugees streamed across borders and thousands died.

The effects of the military, political, and economic disasters of the 1970s have continued through the 1980s, with massive famine developing in Ethiopia and Sudan in 1984 and 1985 and in Ethiopia again in 1987. Throughout the Horn, economic development has come to a standstill. Only the population has continued to grow. World Bank estimates place the present population of the region at almost 80 million. While the West has sent emergency food and medical aid, the Soviets have continued to pour in arms and to exacerbate tensions both between and within Horn countries. They have (until recently at

least) encouraged the potentially most productive country in the region—Ethiopia—to pursue unrealistic economic policies and try to suppress regional dissidence by force.

More than anything else the Horn of Africa needs peace. Military means cannot ameliorate the problems of these countries. The only hope for a better life for the people of the region is the adoption of economic policies that will attract foreign aid and investment and utilize it effectively. How can such conditions be brought about? Prospects for initiative from within the area are poor—governments are weak, leaders fearful and insecure. The Western food keeps people alive but does not alleviate the economic and political deterioration of the region. To end this plight, Western governments must join to implement a program for peaceful engagement in the Horn by setting up an international peace and mediation commission to work toward:

- Acceptance of *de facto* borders by all states in the region, cessation of cross-border subversion, and resort to arbitration of disputes.
- Persuasion of all foreign powers to cease support for separatist or dissident movements.
- Declaration of a moratorium on overt arms shipments into the region.
- Creation of an international observer mechanism to monitor compliance with the peace process and adherence to human rights standards.
- Adherence by all donors to common criteria for provision of emergency relief and development aid, including priority for agriculture.
- Commitment by donors to expanded assistance for regional economic development mechanisms.

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I. HALF A CENTURY OF HISTORY

Some historians maintain that the sequence of events that led to World War II began with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. It is a tenable proposition, but for the majority of the present generation in Europe and America events of that time seem to have occurred in a very distant past. For a region so rich in history as the Horn of Africa, half a century is not a very long time. The last half century, however, has seen more momentous change in the region than it witnessed during several previous centuries.

The Italian Fascist effort to subdue Ethiopia, like so many of the other grand designs of the dictators of the 1930s, ended in failure and led to the destruction of the entire Italian colonial empire. Still it had positive consequences neither desired nor foreseen by Mussolini. It caused destruction and loss of life, but it also gave impetus to the development and modernization process in Ethiopia in respect to both the economic and political order. It brought Ethiopia and the entire region into the consciousness of the world. The surge of European and American concern for the welfare of Ethiopians during recurrent famines since 1984 stems in part from this historic memory.

The British commonwealth campaigns that led to the liberation of the entire Italian African empire in 1941—before the United States even entered World War II—added to worldwide awareness of the geography and cultural heritage of the Horn. Ethiopia, restored to independence, was eager to take a lead for Africa in the postwar world. It could now draw support from the United States and many other countries that previously took little interest in its affairs. Ethiopia became a charter member of the United Nations and only a few years later volunteered forces to help enforce the authority of that body and the principle of the rule of law in Korea.

Early thinking about the problems of Third World development, unrealistic as some of it may have been, included grandiose schemes for harnessing rivers and opening vast regions to modern agriculture in Horn countries. The region was regarded as hopeful and full of potential for economic, political, and human development. It was no accident that two Horn countries—Sudan and Somalia—were in the vanguard of the great tidal wave of independence that gathered force in the late 1950s and engulfed the continent during the following decade.

Was optimism about the Horn in the 1940s and 1950s mistaken? Was the short period of relative peace and progress during the 1950s and the 1960s an aberration? Is the norm for the countries of the region an endless succession of narrowly based authoritarian governments that provoke internal dissension and strain with their neighbors, neglect their economies, and waste their peoples' resources and lives? Is there any hope for escape from the degradation and tension that have plagued all the countries of the Horn in the 1970s and the 1980s?

II. THE 1950s—A TIME OF HOPE AND ANTICIPATION

Before attempting answers to these questions, let us establish some perspective by going back to the 1950s, and sketching out some of the main facts about the region during that period.

Physically, of course, it was essentially the same as it is now. There has been some deterioration in the landscape—cutting of forests, erosion, desertification—but there is room for debate about the fundamental seriousness of these trends and the real causes of natural disasters that periodically afflict the Horn. Man-made destruction of the environment needs to be halted and reversed, but there have been gains and real accomplishments too: dams and irrigation schemes, opening up of new lands to agriculture, locust control, reforestation as well as deforestation, and gradual growth of both governmental and public awareness of environmental problems.

Politically, as of 1955, the region was divided into four colonies and one independent country, Ethiopia. Termed an empire, with traditions that extended back three thousand years, Ethiopia was the only country in sub-Saharan Africa that met most of the accepted criteria for nationhood.¹ It had succeeded in maintaining its independence and, in fact, extending its own territory, in the era of European colonial expansion. Its survival was not, however, cost-free, for it surrendered its northernmost region, Eritrea, to Italy at the end of the nineteenth century, thus sowing the seeds of the Eritrean problem, which seemed closer to solution in the 1950s than it does today.

Sudan, the largest territory in Africa under a single administration, gained its independence from Britain in 1956. The long-standing Anglo-Egyptian condominium arrangement had terminated in 1951, but the age-old links that have always bound these two major Nile valley countries—Sudan and Egypt—into a relationship that entails both attraction and repulsion continued to operate. The other colonies in the Horn region were all “Somalilands”: the small French territory centered on the port of Djibouti; British Somaliland; and the UN trust territory of Somalia—identical to the former Italian colony that had been restored to Italy under a UN trusteeship in 1950 with a commitment to prepare it for independence.

¹Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States, An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1977, especially pp. 342ff.

Socially and economically, most of these people were still leading highly traditional lives. As of the mid-1950s, the population of these territories was estimated as follows:²

Ethiopia	16,000,000
(of which Eritrea)	(1,000,000)
Sudan	10,262,536
Somalia (Italian)	1,267,964
British Somaliland	650,000
French Somaliland	66,832
Total	28,247,332

Most of the population was illiterate, and few had access to education or health services. The majority lived in relative isolation according to patterns that had changed little from ancient times. No more than 5 percent were urbanized, and only a fraction of those led what could be called modern lives. Religious traditions were strong. Agriculture functioned mostly at a subsistence level. Economies operated on a very small scale. A majority of the people of the area lived outside the monetary economy. Exports consisted almost entirely of basic agricultural products. Imports were consumed by, or affected, only a very small percentage of the population.

Politics at the national level was the preserve of a small class of men, some traditional leaders, some newly educated in the Western pattern. The latter, let us call them, for lack of a better comprehensive term, the young technocrats, had high aspirations for their people and had already begun to spread awareness of the possibilities of change. The attitudes of traditional leaders were mixed. The revolution of rising expectations had not yet affected more than a small percentage of the Horn's population.

The mid-1950s saw no serious tensions between the countries of the Horn. Future territorial problems between Ethiopia and Somalia were latent, but mutually destructive confrontations were not foreseen as inevitable. No one was at war with anyone else. Domestically, regional differences, rivalries, and resentments of central authority were not fueling insurgencies or guerrilla movements of any consequence. In fact, the regional dissension that had flared a few years before in Ethiopia had largely been overcome.

²*The Times Atlas of the World*, Mid-Century Edition, Vol. 1, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1958. In light of subsequent developments, the estimate for Ethiopia at that time seems low; 20 million would probably be closer to the actual figure.

Religious differences were not a source of serious political strain except in Sudan, where the apprehensions of Christian and animist southerners about their future in a Muslim Arab-dominated state were growing.

At the beginning of the decade, Eritrea, which had been an Italian colony for 50 years until it was seized by British Commonwealth forces in 1941 (and then went through a period of liberal British military administration which evolved into UN trusteeship), was federated with Ethiopia. At the end of the decade, British Somaliland was joined with the Italian trust territory to form the independent Republic of Somalia. The 1950s were thus a period of important political transitions in the Horn, and predominantly a period of hope.

In Ethiopia, the process of state centralization, which had advanced steadily during the initial phase of Haile Selassie's reign, gained rapid momentum during the 1940s and 1950s. Like all externally imposed federations, the arrangement for Eritrea did not fully satisfy any of the parties involved, but the basic outlook was positive. The main practical significance of the reunification of Eritrea with Ethiopia was economic. Eritrea accounted for a major share of Ethiopia's industry and Ethiopia formed a large natural market for this industry. It also gave Ethiopia a significant export potential. Educated, modernized Eritreans had an advantage over other Ethiopians and played a steadily more important role in Ethiopian economic and professional life during the 1950s and 1960s.

British and Italian colonial administrations implanted different, and strain-causing, political habits and intellectual attitudes in the two parts of the new Somali Republic. Long-standing rivalries among Somali clans were also a source of tension, but none of these problems appeared serious in the euphoria that accompanied independence. Somali nationalism was intense but shallow. It fed a sense of frustration at not being able to incorporate all Somali-inhabited territories into the new republic, which was born irredentist, adopting a five-star flag symbolizing the two territories that were joined in 1960 to form it as well as its claim to French Somaliland, the Ethiopian Ogaden and Haud, and the northeastern third of Kenya.

Both internal and regional tensions were already apparent in the Horn in the 1950s, but there was little basis for assuming that they would inevitably lead to open conflict. The peoples of the region and their leaders, in spite of occasional bold rhetoric, expected the major powers, who retained many kinds of involvements and interests in the region after independence, to exert themselves to settle contentious issues. As the 1950s came to an end, Africa was swept by a wave of optimism about the future. Although political developments overshadowed everything else as the continent began its headlong rush toward independence, successful political evolution was often taken for granted, while new states developed high expectations for economic and social development.

III. PROGRESS—AND TENSIONS—IN THE 1960s

In Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, then in his prime, displayed considerable ingenuity in completing his evolution into a senior African leader and world statesman. Until the end of the 1950s, Ethiopia remained more oriented toward the Middle East and Europe than toward Africa. The governing classes and dominant peoples of Ethiopia did not feel themselves African.

The military coup that attempted to topple the Lion of Judah while he was on a visit to Brazil in 1960 was an amateurish affair. It demonstrated, among other things, that ideas from other parts of Africa were influencing young Ethiopian military officers. It also showed, in an incipient way, the effect of the revolution of rising expectations—impatience that modernization and development were not producing quicker results. But these attitudes were still not widely held or coherently articulated. The majority of young Ethiopians were prepared to work within the traditional system.

Haile Selassie's response to the attempt to overthrow him was vigorous but constructive. He dealt summarily with the perpetrators of the coup and took measures to accelerate modernization. Education, for example, received heightened emphasis. The Emperor responded to President Kennedy's Peace Corps initiative by inviting the United States to send the largest contingent of volunteers in the world to expand secondary education throughout Ethiopia. Planning for systematic economic development was given additional impetus, and young technocrats were brought into the expanding civil administration in large numbers. On the political plane, Haile Selassie seized the initiative in establishing the Organization of African Unity and made Addis Ababa "the capital of Africa," a position it has retained ever since.

Sudan, despite promising beginnings as an independent republic, fared less well. The dominant Arab majority tried to balance a broad spectrum of political forces ranging from communists to religious traditionalists. It was too busy with its own problems, however, to give creative attention to the South, and rebellion gained momentum there. Civilian parliamentary government ended in Khartoum in 1958, when General Abboud seized power and established the Horn's first military regime. Somalia was able to maintain a parliamentary system for more than nine years (until 1969) before its military leadership seized power. Ethiopia, where after the coup of 1960 the military appeared to have little appetite for a new try at taking over the government, maintained its imperial system until

1974. Looking backward, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the countries of the Horn became doomed to a downward spiral of political and economic deterioration only as they fell under military rule.

Economically, the 1960s were a period of substantial progress. Between 1961 and 1967, Ethiopia's gross domestic product (GDP) increased almost 50 percent. Modern manufacturing increased much more rapidly, at an annual average rate of 17.1 percent during the same period. Agricultural growth, however, averaged only about 2 percent a year—an ominous sign of problems to come, but little heeded until the beginning of the 1970s, and then to a greater extent by foreign aid advisers than by Ethiopians themselves.¹ Sudan and Somalia grew more slowly than Ethiopia during the 1960s. While Ethiopia's GDP averaged 4.4 percent growth annually during the decade, the increase in Somalia was only 1 percent and in Sudan 1.3 percent.² All Horn countries attracted increasing external development aid during the 1960s.

External aid was not the key to development progress, however. Ethiopia, which grew the fastest, received the least development aid per capita. The per capita average for the decade was Ethiopia—\$13.80; Sudan—\$26.62; Somalia—\$90.00.³ Direct foreign investment in these countries was not large, but both Ethiopia and Sudan attracted modest investments. The outlook for further investment remained promising until political tensions combined with the effect of the post-1973 petroleum price hike to discourage investors.

While economies grew, political tensions grew too, both inside and between Horn countries. Following independence, both Sudan and Somalia gave priority to the expansion of their armed forces. Sudan had long-standing military traditions. To governments dominated by the military, the best way to stem growing rebelliousness in the South appeared to be deployment of more troops there.

The need for large armed forces was less obvious in Somalia, which was neither threatened by internal insurgency nor by foreign invasion or subversion. The only purpose large Somali armed forces could serve was pursuit of the country's irredentist ambitions.

¹See Paul B. Henze, "The Economic Development of Ethiopia and Kenya, 1950-1974," a paper presented to the Eighth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa, November 1984; to be published in the *Proceedings* of this conference.

²World Bank, *World Development Report 1983*.

³Paul B. Henze, "Arming the Horn, 1960-1980, Military Expenditures, Arms Imports and Military Aid in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan, with Statistics on Economic Growth and Governmental Expenditures," in *Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden, 1984, pp. 637-656.

This was quite apparent to all the foreign powers interested in the region. The Western powers, otherwise highly supportive of the newly independent Somali republic and generous with economic aid, refused to supply military aid to equip a force beyond internal policing needs.

The Soviet Union, eager to gain a footing in the Horn, took advantage of this opportunity to offer Somalia substantial military assistance, which was accepted. By the end of the 1960s, Moscow had sent \$57 million in military equipment to Somalia. With this support Somalia expanded its armed forces to almost half the size of Ethiopia's and four times the size of Kenya's modest military establishment.

The most immediate result of the Soviet military relationship with Somalia was a Somali-backed insurgency in southeastern Ethiopia which reached serious proportions in the late 1960s. The rebellion was finally brought to a halt by a combination of military, civic action, and diplomatic efforts by Haile Selassie's government.⁴

Ethiopia had ancient military traditions based on regional leaders. Following the 1941 liberation, Haile Selassie had moved rapidly to centralize control of the country's military establishment and reorganize it along modern lines. Ethiopia's armed forces benefited from a modest U.S. military aid program which began in 1952 and averaged about \$12 million annually through the 1960s. Sweden, India, and eventually Israel provided training assistance. In addition to service in Korea, Ethiopian military forces did important peacekeeping duty in Zaire in the mid-1960s. Even when insurgency in the Bale/Ogaden region rose to a serious level in the late 1960s and insurgency in Eritrea became a major problem, the U.S. held military aid to Ethiopia to a level which prevented expansion of the country's total armed forces beyond 45,000 men.

At the end of the 1960s, Eritrea became a major military challenge for Ethiopia: Various Soviet surrogates (Eastern European countries, Cuba, and radical Arab states) provided weapons and training to fuel armed rebellion. Communist China, then eagerly competing with the Russians for influence over radical "liberation" movements in many parts of the world, likewise offered significant material support for Eritrean insurgency.

When a radical military group calling themselves the Free Officers headed by Colonel Jaafar Nimeiry mounted a successful coup in Khartoum in the spring of 1969 and turned toward the Soviet Union for support, they found Moscow a quick and enthusiastic supplier of arms, aircraft, and military specialists. Offensive operations against southern rebels increased rapidly (with Soviet pilots even flying bombing missions), and large

⁴See Paul B. Henze, *Rebels and Separatists in Ethiopia*, The RAND Corporation, R-3347-USDP, December 1985, pp. 26-33.

quantities of Soviet equipment shipped to Sudan found its way into the hands of the various Eritrean insurgent groups.

As the 1960s came to an end, a military coup overturned parliamentary government in Mogadishu. General Mohammed Siad Barre, Chief of Staff of the Somali armed forces and a major beneficiary of the generous Soviet military aid program, led the coup. Like Nimeiry in Khartoum, Siad Barre began implementing domestic programs imitative of Soviet practice. Relations with Ethiopia, which had improved markedly under Somalia's last civilian government, became uneasy again.

These key developments in the Horn in the 1960s need to be highlighted because they tend to be overshadowed by the more dramatic changes of the next decade, when the whole region degenerated into war and internal rebellion, economies faltered, and hordes of refugees streamed across borders, to be kept alive by international charity. These depressing developments are often superficially summed up and condemned as the result of superpower rivalry. The label is specious and the characterization begs serious analysis of what really occurred.

The United States supplied military aid only to Ethiopia, a country that made no claims upon its neighbors and had a strong record of adherence to international agreements, encouragement of collective security arrangements, support of international organizations, and arbitration of disputes. Haile Selassie's government gave priority to economic and social development. American economic aid to Ethiopia always exceeded military aid and was supplemented by other official and private programs, such as the Peace Corps and numerous foundation and charitable efforts in the field of health, education, and technical assistance.

The United States also maintained economic aid programs in Sudan and Somalia until such programs were terminated by pro-Soviet governments. In addition, the United States made major contributions to and strongly supported more than a dozen programs sponsored by international organizations and multilateral lending agencies that benefited all Horn countries. Though all significant U.S. aid was bilateral, as was most of the assistance supplied by a broad range of other Western countries, all Western countries encouraged cooperation between Horn countries. Efforts such as the Webe Shebelle valley development plan bore no fruit as tensions rose between Ethiopia and Somalia.

The United States and its allies, however, were not competing with the Soviet Union in any of these efforts, as Soviet bilateral economic assistance programs came late and on a small scale. The Russians contributed nothing to international efforts. The net effect of all Soviet and Soviet-surrogate military aid programs and clandestine arms support for insurgencies was to discourage cooperation and heighten tension between Horn countries.

To speak of superpower rivalry as the source of political and economic deterioration in the Horn of Africa is, therefore, at best excessive politeness and at worst self-delusion. It was the Soviet Union which both directly and indirectly militarized life and politics in the Horn, exacerbated tensions between and within Horn countries, and encouraged authoritarian military leaders who lacked the support of the majority of their populations to engage in foreign adventures, to oppress internal dissent, and to substitute socialist rhetoric for realistic economic and social development programs.

IV. THE DISASTROUS 1970s

The major events of the 1970s are too near and too well known to require repeating. A few summary observations need to be made nevertheless. The basic objective of United States policy at the beginning of this period was to multilateralize its economic involvement in the Horn, to reduce direct governmental aid and stimulate private investment, to terminate its modest military presence in Ethiopia, to reduce expectations of increased military aid, and to promote mediation of regional disputes. At the same time, the United States sought to emphasize human rights and encourage accelerated modernization and more open societies in all Horn countries. These objectives were common to all three U.S. administrations of the 1970s.

The illusions of the early 1970s detente era encouraged the expectation that the Soviet Union might, or could be brought to, share these aims. The Soviet Union, however, saw the Horn as an area of major opportunity in the 1970s, and Somalia and eventually South Yemen as bastions of both Soviet military power and ideological influence in the region.

In 1971, a highly promising situation in Sudan, into which the Soviets had made a major investment of arms, went sour when the Sudan Communist Party tried to overthrow Nimeiry, and Nimeiry disengaged from the Soviet embrace. Then, a momentous change of direction in China created an extraordinary opportunity for statesmanship, and Haile Selassie and Nimeiry seized it.¹ With speed and efficiency that seems incomprehensible in view of the seemingly hopeless impasses in Horn politics that have prevailed over the past ten years, the southern Sudanese rebellion was mediated and outside support for the Eritrean insurgency decisively reduced.

Prospects for restoration of peace and priority for development looked good when the chain of events that culminated in the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 began. It was far from a foregone conclusion that Ethiopia would fall into the hands of junior, politically unsophisticated military leaders, as it did.

¹U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew informed Haile Selassie in July 1971 of the developing U.S. reconciliation with China. Haile Selassie took a large Ethiopian delegation to Peking in October 1971 and negotiated establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in return for termination of Chinese support for Eritrean insurgency and Ethiopian acceptance of a Chinese aid program. On returning, Haile Selassie rapidly moved toward a settlement with Sudan.

In the years 1974 to 1977, Soviet ambitions for hegemony in the Horn fueled a worsening situation that eventually almost escaped Moscow's capacity to manipulate it. The most important indicator of Moscow's intentions was its signing of a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with Siad Barre just as the revolution in Ethiopia began to succeed and, during the subsequent three years, the provision of \$300 million in military assistance to Somalia. Without this assistance Siad Barre could never have mustered the strength and confidence to attack Ethiopia in the summer of 1977.

Meanwhile the Soviets and their surrogates continued to support the rebellion in Eritrea, enabling Marxists to gain predominance among the secessionists. The situation there, ripe for mediation in the fall of 1974, had been steadily exacerbated by the determination of the most pro-Soviet elements in the Ethiopian Derg to bring Eritrea to heel militarily. How all the mysterious developments during these years fit together has yet to be determined—and some of the principal actors themselves may not know—but the results could not have been more favorable to ultimate Soviet interests had they masterminded the whole complex plot—which seems highly unlikely.²

By early 1978 the Soviets, utilizing Cuban mercenaries, had rescued Ethiopia from the predicament into which Moscow's Soviet policies and actions had propelled it, and a sycophantically pro-Soviet leadership in Ethiopia showed its gratitude by resuming its program of remaking the country into a Marxist-Leninist "people's republic" where the "broad masses" in whose name the leadership rules were given no opportunity to exercise any form of choice of their leaders. Large segments of the Ethiopian population, especially in the north and in outlying regions, continued to accept no more central authority than could be forced upon them by coercion or arms.

Somalia presented a dismal spectacle in 1978, likewise the result of its leaders' reliance on Soviet military generosity. Siad Barre nevertheless continued to adhere to socialist economic policies and frustrated his chances of gaining serious Western backing by continuing to support guerrilla operations inside Ethiopia. These two factors, in the final analysis, only benefited the Soviet Union, for tension in the Horn has continued to serve its desire to remain arbiter of Horn politics, with priority to maintaining its hold over Ethiopia, the most important country of the region.

²David A. Korn, *Ethiopia, the United States and the Soviet Union*, Croom Helm, London, 1986; Haggai Erlich, *The Struggle over Eritrea, 1962-1978*, The Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif., 1978; and Paul B. Henze, "Getting a Grip on the Horn," in Walter Z. Laqueur (ed.), *The Pattern of Soviet Conduct in the Third World*, Praeger, New York, 1983.

Both Somalia and Sudan experienced a brief period of promising economic growth during the early 1970s, but the result for Somalia of giving priority to military adventures was compound economic disaster. Cereal imports rose from 42,000 tons in 1974 to 432,000 tons in 1981—a more than tenfold increase.³ The country was driven to inflating the size of its already high refugee population and frustrating international efforts to resettle refugees because it needed to exploit the refugee situation as a means of securing emergency relief, a sizable proportion of which went directly into the domestic economy.⁴

Sudan, with far more attractive economic prospects than Somalia, was also willing to cooperate with friendly governments and international lending agencies to launch major development and investment programs. The country made itself politically attractive by supporting U.S. Middle East peace efforts and by considering participation in U.S.-led efforts to strengthen free world defenses in the entire Horn-Persian Gulf region. Relations with Ethiopia remained strained, negatively influenced *inter alia* by the stubborn persistence of the Ethiopian Marxist regime in seeking an unconditional military solution to the insurgency in Eritrea, further complicated by major insurgencies in Tigre and neighboring northern provinces. Economically, Sudan's development efforts consistently failed to gain momentum. The need for cereal imports increased 2-1/2 times between 1974 and 1981.⁵

Economically, in spite of war, political strife, and insurgency, Ethiopia presented a better picture than its two neighbors through the end of the 1970s. Three factors were primarily responsible: (1) Ethiopia has a more highly developed economic infrastructure and, in coffee, a dependable source of export earnings; (2) the revolutionary regime inherited a much stronger economy and a soundly managed financial system from the imperial regime and was able to continue to draw on dependable sources of bilateral and multilateral economic assistance; (3) the initial effect of land reform, combined with unusually favorable weather, gave a temporary boost to food production. Ethiopia's need for cereal imports, very small in relation to its large population,⁶ increased only from 118,000 tons in 1974 to 207,000 in 1981. A favorable food situation helped camouflage the fact that the Ethiopian economy was beginning to suffer from a serious decline in rate of growth by the end of the 1970s.

³World Bank, *World Development Report 1983*, p. 158.

⁴"Profit in Poverty," *The Economist*, January 9, 1988.

⁵World Bank, *World Development Report 1983*, p. 158.

⁶World Bank population estimates for 1983 were: Ethiopia, 40,900,000; Somalia, 5,100,000; Sudan, 20,800,000. *World Bank Development Report 1985*, p. 174.

Most serious among trends discernible by this time in Ethiopia was an increasing sense of frustration among the population at the failure of the revolution to bring a decisive acceleration in the pace of modernization. The revolutionary leadership was being victimized by its own rhetoric—the expansion of literacy and education in combination with regime mobilization of manpower for development was raising expectations far more rapidly than they could be met. The maintenance of a 300,000-man army and the diversion of more than one-third of the country's budget to military purposes severely curtailed resources available for economic and social programs. The discouragement of private enterprise and the emphasis on large socialist development schemes reduced the rate of net investment to zero by 1981. Conservative financial management, a legacy of the imperial era, nevertheless enabled Ethiopia to avoid the excessive international debt burden that was already a serious problem for Sudan and Somalia.

V. THE HORN IN THE 1980s—CRISIS AND STALEMATE

The Horn's basic problems all worsened during the 1980s. Somalia has remained stalemated both politically and economically. Halfhearted efforts to challenge Siad Barre's leadership have all failed. No alternative leadership with real vision for the country has wanted to take on the burdens that have accumulated during a decade of military disasters and economic stagnation. Many of Somalia's young technocrats have gone abroad to work and their remittances have, along with continued refugee aid, become a major factor in the country's budget. Siad's hopes for levels of military aid that would permit him to resume pursuit of the country's irredentist aims have faded. But no new vision of Somalia's future has emerged.

Sudan's problems have intertwined to produce a complex crisis of the state itself. Nimeiry, who had demonstrated unusual ability as both a realistic and energetic international statesman and a capable domestic leader during the 1970s, degenerated into religious obscurantism in the early 1980s. His actions exacerbated a deteriorating situation in the South.

Internal strain caused the most promising economic development initiatives in Sudan's history to falter and be abandoned by foreign supporters. A serious brain drain has afflicted the country. Little progress has been made in extending infrastructure. The economy has languished in a chronic debt and balance-of-payments crisis. The country's Western orientation was called into question by military leaders who succeeded Nimeiry and has yet to be restored by the current civilian-led government. Famine affected many parts of Sudan almost as seriously as it did Ethiopia during the years 1984-1986. Whether the government proves capable of remedying the economic weaknesses which contributed to the famine is still open to doubt.

Ethiopia's problems captured headlines all over the world. Soon after the Derg completed lavish celebrations of its tenth anniversary in power, formally established the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, and reaffirmed its commitment to build a Soviet-style state and society, it had to admit that the country was being ravaged by a food and supply crisis ten times as serious as the famine of 1973-1974 which revolutionaries exploited to discredit Haile Selassie's rule. The Marxist-Leninist regime's Soviet benefactors, who have supplied the country with at least \$5 billion worth of arms during the past ten years, gave no significant help to overcome the famine crisis. It was alleviated through the efforts of

thousands of Western officials and volunteers distributing \$2 billion worth of food, medicines, and supplies and providing much of the transport to deliver that aid to stricken populations—all contributed by Western governments and private citizens through international organizations.

The Addis Ababa regime attempted unsuccessfully to block delivery of international relief to populations in rebellious northern regions. It sought, again unsuccessfully, with its own people as well as internationally to blame the famine on failure of Western relief to arrive in time. Ethiopia's top leaders have been reluctant to accept much of the serious advice of the international economic community on policy shifts that would eliminate problems that contribute to famine—by no means natural disaster alone.

In the face of strong condemnation from both specialists and public opinion (as well as the reservations of Soviet advisers), Ethiopian leaders persisted in implementing resettlement and villagization programs that offer little promise of short-term positive impact on the country's still precarious food situation. Such programs, introduced gradually on a genuinely voluntary basis, might bring substantial benefits. They would have to be combined with efforts to persuade the peasantry that the regime's ultimate aim is not Soviet-style collectivization—which is still far from clear—and would require not only tolerance but encouragement of private initiative and a free market.

Despite some recent regime concessions to the demands of international lending agencies prompted by the renewed famine of 1987-1988, the outlook is still far from promising. Nevertheless, the widespread realization—among medium- and lower-level officials and the citizenry at large—of the real nature of the political and economic problems Ethiopia faces may eventually influence the Marxist-Leninist leadership. Ethiopia, despite the large outflow of refugees and talented defectors, has not suffered as serious a brain drain as Somalia and Sudan.

All Horn countries have continued during the 1980s to divert a major share of their domestic resources, and all the foreign military assistance they have been able to obtain, to the maintenance of military forces who contribute nothing to these countries' development objectives. The Soviet Union's willingness to continue the massive supply of arms to Ethiopia and its encouragement of the Ethiopian support of insurgency in the Sudanese South as well as occasional adventurism in Somali border regions, primarily have exacerbated the political and military tensions in the Horn. In contrast, U.S. military aid to Sudan and Somalia (as well as Kenya) has never risen to a level exceeding 10 percent of known Soviet deliveries and has fallen sharply since the mid-1980s.

While some conservative Arab states continue to aid insurgent movements in Eritrea and Tigre, these groups now evidently rely as much on ammunition and weaponry captured from Ethiopian forces or sold by individual disaffected soldiers as they do on outside sources. Suspicions persist among Ethiopian regime officials that some support from communist sources continues to reach rebel movements as part of a Soviet scheme to maintain pressure on Addis Ababa, whose Marxist-Leninist militants it has never trusted fully, despite their demonstrated determination to implement a neo-Stalinist system in Ethiopia.

The Soviets' and Soviet bloc countries' grudging support of Ethiopian economic development remains inconsequential in terms of Ethiopia's vast needs and potential for absorbing aid. Moreover, such support frequently is counterproductive because of sponsorship of projects ill-suited to Ethiopia's priority needs or ability to gain effective return from local inputs that will be required on a continuing basis. Thus, Ethiopia must continue to rely on bilateral aid from major free world donors and lenders and from such international organizations as the World Bank and the European Economic Community. All Western aid that Ethiopia receives is subject to increasing conditionality in respect to form of utilization and performance, as well as to human rights considerations.

The many dissident, separatist, and insurgent movements that exist in Ethiopia have displayed little genuine dynamism or political creativity. Moreover, the most effective ones, those in Eritrea and Tigre, are at least as Marxist-Leninist as the Addis Ababa regime which they oppose. Nevertheless, the Derg has made little progress in subduing them militarily, and prospects are poor that it will ever be able to do so.

Meanwhile, various forms of passive resistance to the leadership's efforts to remold Ethiopian society in the pattern of the Soviet-style people's republic, declared in September 1987, continue to spread. These include religious resurgence among both Christians and Muslims, widespread intellectual disaffection, and pervasive pro-Americanism among all elements of the population. Even more important, because of its direct impact on short- and medium-term regime economic and social objectives, an ever-growing share of the country's productive economic activity is being diverted to the underground or informal sector.

Conservative estimates place the present population of the Horn at over 70 million, more than double what it was 30 years ago.¹ Clearly, although perhaps as many as two million people in the Horn may have died as a result of war, insurgency, and famine during

¹World Bank estimates a total population in the three major Horn countries of 79 million by 1990 and 95 million by the end of this century. *World Development Report 1985*, p. 210.

the past 30 years, conditions have never deteriorated to the point where the naturally high reproduction rates of the region—despite high infant mortality and low average longevity—have not failed to compensate rapidly for losses. Unimpressive as medical advances in the region have been by the standards of the developed world, there is nevertheless good reason to believe that recent gains of a very elementary kind (the spread of immunization and greater availability of elementary medicines) are resulting in much higher survival rates for children and the gradual extension of life for adults. Birthrates have not only not fallen but have probably risen during the past decade.

The net rate of increase in all three major Horn countries is probably now no lower than 3 percent per year. Barring man-made or natural disasters, or a combination of both of a magnitude the region has not witnessed in modern times, this rate is likely to prevail into the twenty-first century. What prospect can there be for the people of this area, all of whom are now to some degree touched by the realization that human beings everywhere no longer have to resign themselves to the limitations and hardships of traditional subsistence existence, for a genuinely better life? What are the preconditions for peace and development in the Horn? Is it naive to hope that they can in any degree be met?

VI. PREREQUISITES FOR PEACE AND SUSTAINED DEVELOPMENT

More than anything else, the Horn of Africa needs peace—peace in each country and among the countries of the region. No country has gained from rivalry with its neighbors. Somalia's efforts to unite Somali populations under Mogadishu rule have benefited no one, but they have been most disastrous for the people they were supposed to liberate and join to the motherland. Hundreds of thousands of these people have, in effect, been held hostage in refugee camps for nearly a decade with little hope of improvement of their situation. More tragic and irrational still is the tension between Ethiopia and Sudan, with each abetting insurgencies in the other's territory, for the two countries have no disagreements over the long border between them and no serious aspirations to rule over populations resident in the other's territory.

Insecure Horn governments justify themselves to their people as champions of "national integrity," while their leaders' policies and actions are the primary cause of dissension and resentments which threaten national integrity. Arab-oriented governments in Khartoum were unable to impose central rule on the South during the 1960s and early 1970s. Attempts to do so in the 1980s have been equally futile, so much so that a body of opinion has grown in the Sudanese North favoring (at least in terms of lip service) southern independence; at the same time, some southerners have abandoned separatist aspirations and come to advocate Sudanese unity within the framework of a genuine federal system.

The revolutionary Marxist-Leninist leadership in Ethiopia set the country on the road to disaster early in its tenure when it rejected all efforts to settle the Eritrean problem through negotiation and compromise. Rigid authoritarian methods and efforts to force a highly varied country into a centralized system of authoritarian management of the economy have generated rebellion and many kinds of less open resistance throughout Ethiopia. Even in Somalia, where the population is essentially homogeneous in language, culture, and religion, the northern part of the country has become increasingly alienated from the South.

All Horn countries would benefit from experimenting honestly with genuine forms of autonomy and federalism. Marxism-Leninism and imitations of Soviet nationality policy show no promise of leading to effective solutions, for all such forms of autonomy are illusory. Authoritarian governments attempting to enforce uniform policies throughout their territory find themselves caught in a vicious circle. Lacking confidence in their own ability to exercise full control over the national territory and fearful of foreign interference, they

shrink from giving disaffected regions and ethnic groups the opportunity to manage their own affairs. Lacking confidence in governments that have tried to force them to accept unacceptable policies, alienated regions and groups will tend to take matters into their own hands to whatever extent they can.

The restoration of the kind of domestic tranquillity that existed in Horn countries in the 1950s will not be easy to achieve because the past two decades have left a serious legacy of suspicion and resentment that cannot be overcome quickly. The first requirement for internal pacification and restoration of confidence in these societies is reduction of tensions between the countries of the region and their immediate neighbors. Horn governments must seriously commit themselves to noninterference in each other's affairs. If the Horn countries can begin by cooperating in limited areas of common interest, there is some possibility that cooperation could spread and take root. While the initiative for regional cooperation must in part come from within the region, it must be matched by an honest commitment from outside powers to refrain from actions that encourage regional tensions. Some forms of regional cooperation have survived all the turmoil of the past two decades; the Desert Locust Control Organization of East Africa is perhaps the best example.

Foreign—especially Soviet—influences, pressures, enticements, and habits of meddling in the Horn have contributed greatly to the destabilization of the region. The Soviet Union has alternately encouraged separatist movements and authoritarian central governments, changing sides to fit its own power ambitions. It has introduced mercenaries into the region: Cubans, East Germans, East Europeans who would, if acting in terms of the genuine interests of their own hard-pressed countries, have no reason to be expending resources or pursuing the policies that they have been implementing. Vast supplies of Soviet military hardware over a period of nearly 25 years have created hordes of refugees who have been cared for by the resources of the free world. Arab governments, the other prime source of support for dissidents in the Horn and at times for authoritarian adventurers in power, have likewise shown little sense of responsibility for the consequences of their actions.

The free world and international organizations supported by it have proved the only dependable source of funds for economic development and serious investment in the Horn. If these countries and institutions have been irresponsible, their negligence lies primarily in the failure to match their generosity with policies and standards of implementation that press and draw the countries of the Horn toward cooperation among themselves and modification of internal policies in the direction of greater political and social autonomy and, above all, the creation of conditions to sustain genuine economic progress.

The only basic wealth the countries of the Horn possess is the actual and potential talents of their people and the natural resources of their land. Although deficient in readily exploitable mineral resources (but by no means entirely devoid of them), the Horn has the basic requirements for productive agriculture. If India not only can feed a vastly more numerous and steadily growing population but have food left over for export, the Horn can certainly do so.¹ Not only the example of India but experience elsewhere in Africa demonstrates that with incentives and the application of Green Revolution techniques farmers can produce surpluses that can feed cities, supply agroindustry, and sustain export markets. In Ethiopia, the Horn country in which this transformation could, theoretically, be most easily realized, we see a dogmatic leadership forcing policies upon its peasantry that prevent them from realizing their potential.

Notwithstanding the widely recognized basic intelligence and ingenuity of its people, the Horn has been singularly unfortunate in recent years in the leaders it has produced, or permitted to consolidate power. All have inclined toward dogmatic authoritarianism; none has shown real trust in the people, although indulging in continual posturing in the name of the "broad masses." All have elevated issues of borders and symbols of authority to problems of overriding importance, causes of war, and internal violence. The people of the Horn have demonstrated by their own actions that such considerations are of little relevance to them. Tense and frozen as relations between Ethiopia and Somalia have been, the people who live in the border regions of these countries cooperate in all sorts of informal economic endeavors to their mutual benefit. The result is an informal East African free trade area that extends from the Republic of Djibouti through eastern Ethiopia and Somalia all the way down to northern Kenya.

Gorbachev reportedly told Mengistu over a year ago that Ethiopia cannot expect repeated massive resupply of major military equipment for more futile Red Star campaigns in Eritrea. Gorbachev also apparently counseled Mengistu to settle the Eritrean problem by compromise, including improvement of relations with Arab neighbors, so as to reduce their incentive to support separatist insurgency. The critique of Derg economic policies prepared

¹A geographic comparison between India and the Horn could be rewarding as a possible means of gaining some measure of the abstract agricultural potential of the Horn. The two areas are roughly equal in area: the four Horn countries, 4,382,557 sq. km.; the five countries of the Indian subcontinent, 4,127,569 sq. km. Both regions have extraordinarily broad variations of terrain and climate with both large uncultivable areas and unusually fertile regions. The population of the Indian subcontinent is ten times that of the Horn countries and grows all its essential food requirements.

by the Soviet advisory group in the Ethiopian Central Planning Commission in the summer of 1985 demonstrates, for the most part, more realism about Ethiopian economic performance and potential than the Derg's senior planners themselves have displayed.

Are the Soviets perhaps adjusting their own policies in the Horn? Obviously, some officials of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) fear that this may be occurring.² Possibly, but Gorbachev's ability to implement his reform program in the USSR itself is still far from demonstrated. Faced with hard choices, Gorbachev may well be forced to opt for short-term maintenance of Soviet hegemony in Ethiopia—"toughing it out"—rather than risk changes that could lead to a reversal of the gains the Soviets made in the region in 1977-1978. In any case, the West should not be so devoid of creativity, and a sense of responsibility, as to wait for Gorbachev's equivocal pressures on Mengistu to have effect. What does the West—with either the United States or the European Community in the lead—have to lose by experimenting with a bit of initiative?

We have little reason to believe that the region can generate the initiative for creating the prerequisites of peace in the Horn. What hope there is for a better future for this highly attractive and intrinsically important part of the world, the natural link between Africa and the Middle East, must rest primarily on outside initiative. The repetition of famine in Ethiopia and Sudan during the winter of 1987-1988 and current international relief efforts underscore the need for coordinated action.

A Western plan for helping the region to escape from the vicious downward cycle of multilevel conflict and frustrated development aspirations might include the following initiatives:

- Establishment of an international commission to explore initiatives for peace and mediation of tensions among the countries of the region. Ideally, such a commission would have United Nations sponsorship and seek the endorsement of the Organization of African Unity (OAU); however, experience with such undertakings has been frustrating. A commission focused on the Horn will have maximum chances of success if it can operate flexibly and informally with a minimum of diplomatic formalities.

²This specific observation and much of the discussion in the final section of this essay reflects discussions in Addis Ababa and elsewhere in Ethiopia during my visit in March 1987.

- Adherence by all Horn governments to a declaration of acceptance of existing borders in the region in accordance with OAU principles and mutual cessation of support for movements aiming to undermine neighboring governments. Establishment of an arbitration mechanism to mediate complaints.
- An appeal to all countries providing clandestine financial or material support for separatist or dissident movements in the region to cease such support.
- A moratorium on overt arms shipments to the area, accompanied by a program for negotiation of mutual reduction of military manpower both among Horn countries and with guerrilla and insurgent movements within them.
- Facilitation of establishment of international policing forces to oversee restoration of security and maintenance of communications and trade in disturbed border or coastal regions.
- Agreement among donor countries on a set of criteria for provision of economic development assistance as well as emergency relief for all Horn countries. These would include adoption and implementation of rational economic development strategies, priority for agriculture, and recognition of basic human rights for all citizens.
- Special emphasis on coordinated economic development plans for areas that have been afflicted by insurgency and guerrilla warfare: Eritrea, southern Sudan, the Ogaden.
- As a reward for success, a commitment by participating governments and international organizations to provide increased development assistance and incentives for private investment in the region, support of major infrastructure projects benefiting the entire region, development of joint production and marketing agencies among Horn countries and institutions for manpower training, technical research, and application of Green Revolution technology.

The program for peaceful engagement in the Horn of Africa outlined above will not be easy to implement. It needs refinement and ingenuity. While the program will be most effective if implemented as a whole, separate actions can nevertheless have beneficial effect. Western governments, legislatures, and publics will have to be persuaded to commit themselves to sustained and patient effort to create preconditions for restoration of peace and economic viability to the region. Western leaders must repeatedly underscore the obvious fact that short of a major initiative by the free world in this troubled region, only palliative

effect can come from resources that are currently being expended upon it. Publics that support and subscribe to large-scale famine relief operations should not find it difficult to grasp the desirability of a program aimed at bettering the lives of the people who are merely being kept alive.

Current Horn leaders bent upon maximizing their own tenuous hold over the people they are trying to rule may initially scorn a program for peaceful engagement in the Horn. Rejection should not discourage persistence. All the peoples of the Horn have a positive orientation toward the Western world. The free world has extensive means of communication with the Horn. With continual realistic explanation of the advantages of peaceful engagement, the principles it includes could become so much a part of popular thinking, and gain so much support among the lower- and middle-level officials of Horn governments, that leaders would be forced to embrace successive features of the program or be replaced by others who favored it.

In light of major shifts in Soviet policy that appear to be taking place during the present era of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, and in view of the anticipated reduction of Soviet presence in Afghanistan during the next year or two, one may hope for some degree of eventual Soviet cooperation in efforts to establish peace in the Horn of Africa. The Soviets have large commitments to the region, though neither as large nor as direct as in Afghanistan. They have produced no more lasting dividends for Moscow than intervention in Afghanistan. More than two decades of increasingly active Soviet policy in the Horn have exacerbated tensions within and among the countries of the region and blighted economic development prospects. To save itself the embarrassment of association with further decline and disaster, Moscow would be well advised to begin disengagement.

Logical as this appears to Western observers, the net effect of prospective withdrawal from Afghanistan may nevertheless reinforce the Soviet policy to "tough it out" in the Horn. Gorbachev's approach to Angola since 1985 provides a precedent for this possibility. Despite tentative indications of Soviet impatience with Ethiopia, no concrete actions reveal a basic change in the Soviet approach to this country either. We would be wise to be extremely modest, if not even pessimistic, in our expectations of Soviet reaction to a program for peaceful engagement in the Horn. The best that could be initially expected of the Soviet Union is neutrality toward such an effort. In light of past experience, even this may be expecting too much. Proponents of the program must be prepared for misrepresentation by the Soviets and attempts to undermine it. Such behavior on the part of the Soviet Union should not be accepted passively by Western leaders, but should be exposed and challenged in both bilateral and multilateral contexts.

The example of Afghanistan applies in one key respect to the Horn as well, though the Horn situation is much more complex. Determined Western advocacy of Afghan independence and backing for Afghan freedom fighters appears to have forced the Russians to recognize the futility of trying to subdue the country by force. The West has found no freedom fighters in the Horn worthy of support and the region consists of several countries set against each other, as well as internally divided.

The common denominator in the Horn is not guerrillas fighting occupation armies but the people of all these countries who thirst for stability and the opportunity to better their lives. They lack confidence in the policies their governments have been following. They know that dogmatic authoritarianism, whether justified in the name of Marxism-Leninism, religion, ethnic exclusivity, or some other excuse for oppression, undermines their interests. The West stands for human rights, free markets, open societies. The Soviet Union's record demonstrates the opposite.

Soviet enticements to the peoples of the Horn have lost their appeal. Ever larger shipments of arms will not revive it. The stagnant and crisis-ridden Soviet economy cannot provide economic aid and investment in the quantities needed to restore developmental momentum to the Horn. The Russians face two choices in the Horn: (1) to go on exacerbating tensions and delaying the region's prospects for recovery and movement toward self-propelled economic growth and modernization, thus intensifying the hatred the peoples of the region feel for them and (2) acquiescing in and/or eventually at least tacitly supporting free world efforts to promote real peace and lay the basis for economic, political, and social reconstruction in the countries of the region.

The persistent Western pursuit of a program of peaceful engagement in the region can bring Moscow leaders to recognize, as it appears to be doing in Afghanistan, that adherence to a failed course can only raise costs and magnify the scope of the ultimate disaster they will bring upon themselves.